(Reproducing the article which i had sent to IIM Shillong for their Finance Magazine "Niveshak", though this was never published:P)
Industry forecast suggest that Islamic Banking assets with commercial
banks globally, will reach $1.1 trillion in 2012 (2010: $826 bn). If we
consider only the Middle East and North African Countries(MENA), which
constitute a major share of Islamic Banking industry, Islamic banking assets
increased to $416bn in 2010, representing a five year CAGR of 20% compared to
less than 9% for leading conventional banks. But Islamic Banking Industry is still fragmented with most Islamic banks
holding less than $13bn assets – yet to achieve scale, facing pressure on
profitability.
If we compare the performances of IBs with CBs
then Islamic Banking industry’s ROE now appears to be stabilizing around 10%
down from 23% in 2006. Inspite of having higher financing income, higher
provisions and operating costs have contributed to the steep decline in
profitability of Islamic banks.
Also if we compare Staff cost/operating expenses(2010), it is 60% in
Islamic Banks compared to 54% in conventional banks and the ratio of Staff Cost
and Deposits(2010) is 3% and 0.8% respectively. Higher Staff Costs should
translate to better performance but Islamic Banks lag behind their conventional
peers which again indicates a lack of operational efficiency. A study done by
Ernst & Young (‘A Brave New World of Sustainable Growth’ ) suggests that
Operational efficiency can improve the Profitability of Islamic Banks by 25%
Comparing IBs and CBs during the Financial Crisis
To
assess the impact of the crisis, there was a study carried out by IMF and it
used bank-level data covering 2007−10 for about 120 IBs and CBs in eight
countries—Bahrain (including offshore), Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE and the evidence showed that in 2008, IBs fared
better in all countries, except Qatar, the UAE, and Malaysia. In Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain offshore, Jordan, and Turkey, the change in profitability was
significantly more favorable for IBs. The picture was reversed in 2009, with
IBs faring clearly worse in three countries. In Bahrain (including offshore),
and the UAE, the profitability of IBs declined significantly more than that of
CBs, while in Qatar the increase in IB‘s profitability was significantly lower
than that of CBs
Factors related to IBs‘ business
model helped contain the adverse impact on profitability in 2008, while
weaknesses in risk management practices in some IBs led to larger decline in
profitability compared to CBs in 2009. In particular, adherence to Shariah principles precluded IBs from
financing or investing in the kind of instruments that have adversely affected
their conventional competitors and triggered the global financial crisis. The
weak performance in some countries was associated with sectoral concentration and,
in some cases, was facilitated by exemptions from concentration limits,
highlighting the importance of a neutral regulatory framework for IBs and CBs
and strengthening risk management in some banks.
Despite higher profitability during
the pre-global crisis period (2005–07), IBs‘ average
profitability for 2008–09 was
similar to that of CBs, indicating better cumulative (pre- and post-crisis) profitability and
suggesting that higher pre-crisis profitability was not driven by a strategy of greater risk taking.
Large IBs have fared better than small ones. Better diversification, economies of
scale, and stronger reputation might have contributed to this better performance. This suggests
that developing the industry and increasing competition should be achieved through
establishing large and well managed IBs that can compete with existing banks. Also IBs‘ credit
and asset growth were at least twice higher than that of CBs during the crisis,
suggesting a growing market share going forward and larger supervisory
responsibility.
While the global crisis gave IBs an
opportunity to prove their resilience, it also highlighted the need to address important
challenges. The crisis has led to greater recognition of the importance of liquidity risks, and
the need for efficient bank resolution framework. Hence, building a
well-functioning liquidity management infrastructure is a key priority.
Moreover, regulators and standard-setters
for IBs should ensure that the supervisory and legal infrastructure, including for bank resolution,
remain relevant to the rapidly changing Islamic financial landscape and global
developments. Reform
efforts in this regard should interface with the global reform agenda.
Greater convergence and harmonization of regulations and products and offering a greater
variety of Products consistent with Shariah principles is needed to facilitate
an efficient and sustainable growth of the industry.